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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken by George Baum and Oliver Baum 
(hereinafter referred to as appellants) from the order made 
by the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge of the District Court 
of Utah County, sustaining objections to the admission of 
evidence in support of their petition for construction of will 
and determination of their interest in testator's estate, and 
dismissing the said petition (R. 33). 
On May 8, 1954, testator died in Provo City, Utah 
County, State of Utah. Shortly thereafter his will was ad-
mitted to probate in the District Court of Utah County 
(R. 9). 
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Testator was survived by his six children, Vadis B. 
McOmber, Ora B. Nielson, George Baum, Murray Baum, 
Newell Baum, and Oliver Baum, all of whom were men-
tioned in testator's will (R. 10). On May 28, 1954, the tes-
tator's will was duly admitted to probate and letters of ad-
ministration with will annexed were issued (R. 8, 9). On 
December 10, 1954, the Administrator filed a Petition for 
Partial Distribution of testator's estate to some of the de-
visees and legatees named in the will but excluding appel-
lants (R. 15). On January 13, 1955, the appellants herein 
filed their objection to the Petition for Partial Distribution 
and in connection therewith their Petition for Construction 
of Will and Determination of Petitioners' Interest in Estate 
of Testator (R. 18). After an answer was filed to the pe-
tition for construction of will, a hearing was had thereon 
(R. 28, 31). At the hearing, appellant Oliver Baum was 
called and sworn as a witness and offered to give evidence 
in support of the allegations of the petition for construc-
tion of testator's will (R. 31). Thereupon the Administrator 
objected to the introduction of this evidence on grounds that 
the evidence varied the provisions of the will (R. 31). After 
taking the objection under advisement the court made an 
order sustaining the objection of the Administrator and 
dismissing the petition of appellants (R. 33). 
Appellants' petition alleged the following facts which 
are admitted by the court's ruling herein complained of (R. 
18): 
In 1922 and prior thereto, John W. Baum, (hereinafter 
referred to as testator) owned and operated several fanns 
in the vicinity of Ashton, Idaho. At that time and prior 
thereto two of his sons, the appellants, worked for the tes-
tator in the operation of the aforesaid farms. In 1922 the 
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testator became financially involved. All of his farms were 
heavily mortgaged, and his wife was about to commence 
divorce proceedings against him. In 1923 the testator asked 
the appellants to take over and operate all of his Idaho prop-
erties. It was then agreed between testator and appellants 
that if they would take the farms, operate them, pay off all 
mortgage obligations, and taxes, they were to each receive 
as consideration for their work one farm. Pursuant to this 
agreement in 1923 the testa tor transferred all his farm 
properties in the Ashton, Idaho, vicinity to appellants. They 
operated these properties from 1923 to 1927. With the pro-
ceeds obtained from their working testator's property and 
property they had leased from others during that period, 
appellants paid off all the mortgages on testator's property, 
both principal and interest; paid all the delinquent taxes 
beginning with the year 1921 and all taxes assessed against 
the property through 1927; paid out $5,000.00 on notes 
which the testator had co-signed with other of his children; 
and paid over $6,000.00 in cash directly to the testator. The 
total amount of payments made on the testator'-s property, 
to him directly, and on notes he had signed, exceeded $30,-
000.00 in that period. 
In 1927, appellants conveyed back to the testator his 
farm property in the Ashton, Idaho, vicinity. Appellants 
each retained one farm, of the value at that time of about 
$8,000.00 each. 
In 1928 appellants entered into a contract of sale with 
the testator for the purchase of one of the tracts of land 
they had conveyed back to him in 1927. The total purchase 
price of $22,000.00 was paid for same in full to the testator 
in 1929 by appelants. The purchase price was paid by them 
by their borrowing money and mortgaging their property. 
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In 1928 when the aforesaid property was purchased by 
appelLants, the testator claimed that $3,250.00 was still owed 
to him by appellants for certain obligations still existing 
against the property they had conveyed back to him in 1927. 
Thereupon the testator as party of the first part and appel-
lants as parties of the second part entered into a release and 
discharge agreement whereby appellants and testator re-
leased and discharged any and all claims existing between 
them in consideration for appellants' payment of the $3,-
250.00. 
Since 1928 there have been no commercial transactions 
between testator and appellants. Since then there have been 
no advancements of money, real or personal property, or 
property of any kind whatsoever from testator to them. 
Since 1922 and up to the time of the testator's decease, the 
relationship between testator and appellants has been cor-
dial, friendly, and characterized by filial love and respect. 
The issue to be decided on this appeal is whether the 
trial court erred in excluding the proferred extrinsic evi-
dence by holding that testator's will is unambiguous, def-
inite and certain. 
The following points substantiate appellants' conten-
tion that the trial court erred in so holding, and that tes-
tator's will is ambiguous and his intention unclear. 
STATEl\'IENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, DEF-
INITE AND CERTAIN AND THAT IT WAS TESTA-
TOR'S INTENTION TO CUT OFF GEORGE BAUM AND 
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OLIVER BAUM WITH ONE DOLLAR EACH AND NO 
MORE. THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND TESTATOR'S 
INTENT UNCLEAR AS SHOWN BY THIE PROVISIONS 
THEREOF. 
POINT TWO 
THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE WILL IS ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES THEREIN. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FIN/DING THAT THE 
WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, DEF-
INITE AND CERTAIN AND THAT IT WAS TESTA-
TOR'S INTENTION TO CUT OFF GEORGE BAUM AND 
OLIVER BAUM WITH ONE DOLLAR EACH AND NO 
MORE. THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND TESTATOR'S 
INTENT UNCLEAR AS SHOWN BY TH!E PROVISIONS 
THEREOF. 
By the following portion of testator's will his intention 
to treat all of his children alike in the disposition of his 
property is clearly shown: 
XI 
"It is also my wish and desire that my aforesaid 
children accept the provisions of this, my Last Will 
and Testament in the spirit in which I have made them. 
It is my desire to treat all my children alike in the dis-
position of my property and the aforesaid provisions, 
accomplish this result in as fair and equal a manner as 
could be done. I direct and request that the affairs of 
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my estate shall be settled up in a peaceable and in an· 
appreciative manner." 
But, by the following provisions of the testator's will aP-
pellants were each bequeathed One Dollar and no more: 
IV 
"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son, 
Oliver Baum, the sum of One !Dollar ($1.00) and no 
more, he having heretofore received in real property 
his full share of my estate." 
v 
"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son, 
George Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no 
more, he having heretofore received in real property 
. his full share of my estate." 
, ,, T• -:-~ 
Paragraph II of testator's will contains the followillg 
recital : 
"I have already advanced money and property to 
my sons, George Baum and Oliver Baum which is equiv-
alent to their full share in my estate." 
Paragraph III of testator's will provides as follows: 
III 
"I hereby direct and order that my land, money, 
or other property advanced or settled by me in my life-
time which I have mentioned in the last preceding para-
graph, to or for the benefit of any child of mine, shall 
be full satisfaction to such child, unless I shall have 
otherwise declared by writing under my hand." 
It is in reference to the above provisions of the testa-
tor's will that ambiguities arise. The language used in these 
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provisions leaves doubt as to whether testator intended that 
appellants be cut off from participation in testator's estate; 
whether advancements made to any child of his should be 
considered in determining their share in his estate; whether 
any advancement made, aside from the amount thereof, 
was to be considered a full share·; whether testator had 
made what in law amounts to an advancement to appellants; 
and whether testator desired that any writing of his be used 
in determining whether appellants were to be left One Dol-
lar and no more. 
The above provisions of testator's will must be con-
strued and interpreted in the light of testator's declaration 
contained in paragraph XI of his will. Therein testator de-
clared: "It is my desire to treat all of my children alike 
in the disposition of my property . . .". In light of this 
provision, testator's bequest to appellants of One Dollar each 
in paragraphs IV and V raises serious doubt as to whether 
testator intended to accord like treatment to his children, 
or whether he intended to exclude appellants from any par-
tici~ation in the distribution of his property. 
In paragraph II of the will testator declares that he had 
already advanced "money" and "property" to the appel-
lants. In paragraph III thereof he refers to the property 
mentioned in paragraph II and directs that his "land, money, 
or other property", so settled by him in his lifetime, "to or 
for the benefit of any child of (his), shall be full satisfac-
tion to such child, unless (he) shall have otherwise declared 
by writing under (his) hand." This provision sharply quali-
fies the advances made by testator in his lifetime which 
"shall be full satisfaction to such child", to advances, "to or 
for the benefit of any child of mine". This raises the ques-
tion as to whether any advances have been made by testator 
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to or for the benefit of any child of his, particularly appel-
lants. But by the final phrase of this paragraph testator 
says that such advances shall be "full satisfaction" to the 
child receiving same "unless I shall have otherwise de-
clared by writing under my hand." The paragraph indi-
cates that the testator had doubts in his mind as to: 
(1) What advances, if any, he had made to his chil-
dren? 
(2) As to which children advances had been made 
by him? 
(3) What, if any, declarations in writing under his 
hand he had made with respect to such advances? 
Thus the provisions of paragraphs IT and m create an 
ambiguity as to the intended effect of the advances, andre-
flects the testator's doubts as to whether prior writings 
may not show that no advancements had been made. 
By paragraphs IV and V the testator cuts off his sons 
Oliver Baum and George Baum with One Dollar, basing his 
action in each case on the declaration "he having hereto-
fore received in real property his full share of my estate." 
Here again doubt and ambiguity appears from the testator's 
language. In paragraph II he declared the advances to ap-
pellants to be "money and property". In paragraph m he 
declares same to be "land, money or other property". But 
in paragraphs IV and V testator limits the advancements 
to real property. 
The foregoing provisions concerning advancements cre-
ate ambiguities with respect thereto in the following par-
ticulars: 
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( 1) Did the testa tor in his lifetime make any 
transfers or conveyances to George Baum and Oliver 
Baum of any or either of the different kinds of prop-
erty mentioned in paragraphs II, III, IV, or V which 
amount to advances under the Utah law? 
(2) If such transfers and conveyances testator 
made amount to advancements under our law, what did 
he intend with respect thereto by his declarations in 
paragraph III of his will? 
(a) Does the language used by the testator 
herein express doubt as to what property was ad-
vanced by him to or for the benefit of which of 
his children? 
(b) To resolve that doubt did the testator 
provide therein that such advances as he may have 
made to any child of his shall be full satisfaction 
"unless (he) shall have otherwise declared in writ-
ing under (his) hand"? 
( 3) What did the testa tor intend by the provision 
in paragraph III "unless I shall have otherwise declared 
by writing under my hand."? 
(a) Does this language used mean his writ-
ten and signed declarations prior to the making of 
his will? 
(b) Or does the language look to the future 
and a time subsequent to the making of the will? 
(c) Or does this language have both a retro-
spective and a prospective meaning? 
(d) If testator has so otherwise declared, 
does that satisfy his advancement declarations in 
the will and result in the child or children con-
cerned sharing equally with the others in the dis-
position of testator's property? 
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It is to be noted that in each of the above quoted para-
graphs of testator's will reference is made to advancements, 
but in no instance is any amount of money, or item of other 
property identified. Also, the question arises as to why tes-
tator recited "money and property", in paragraph II, "land, 
money, or other property", in paragraph III, and in para-
graphs IV and V states that the advancements to appel-
lants had been in real property. It seems a reasonable in-
terpretation of this will that in providing therein these 
things the testator desired that advancements of any kind 
of property to any of his children should be considered in 
determining their respective shares. 
Appellants' contention that it was the testator's desire 
to consider all advancements made to any of his children 
in determining their share in his estate, is borne out by the 
presence in paragraph III of the phrase "to or for the bene-
fit of any child of mine". We submit that there is no other 
reason for the presence of this phrase in testator's will un-
less for that purpose. A reading of the will up to the point 
of this phrase shows exclusive reference to appellants. The 
phrase broadens the scope of the application of the provi-
sions therein on advancements to include any of testator's 
children. In light of this the reading of paragraph m raises 
the question of what the testator intended to result from 
the fact of an advancement to any one of his six children. 
It is submitted that in view of the fact that testator's 
declared intention was to treat his children alike, and since 
the will itself declares that advancements have been made 
to appellants, the following provision of the Utah Code 
clearly requires that the court must hear all evidence touch-
ing upon the question of advancements made by the tes-
tator: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Section 75-12-9 Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
"Advancements to be determined - Conclusiveness 
of decree - All questions as to advancements made or 
alleged to have been made by the decedent to his heirs 
may be heard and determined by the court, and must 
be specified in the decree assigning and distributing the 
estate; and the final judgment or decree of the court 
is binding on all parties interested in the estate, subject 
only to be reversed, modified or set aside on appeal." 
In the light of the foregoing statute the trial ,court erred 
in refusing to receive or consider the proferred evidence 
concerning advancements. 
Appellants admit that testator could have cut them off 
simply by stating that such was his desire and leaving each 
one dollar. However, the testator does not do this. He 
declares why he leaves one dollar bequests to appellants, his 
declaration being that he had already given appellants their 
share of this property. The fact that such a declaration 
is made shows that testator had no ill feeling toward appel-
lants, and that he did not want them cut off without giv-
ing them their full share of his estate. 
It is the position of appellants that testator in his ap-
parent desire to treat all of his children alike in the distri-
bution of his estate to them, made the foregoing declara-
tions and provisions in his will which have created serious 
ambiguities that can only be 'Clarified and resolved by re-
sorting to extrinsic evidence; that appellants' proferred ex-
trinsic evidence would clarify the ambiguities, particularly 
as concerns the rna tter of advancements and would give ef-
fect to the declared intention of testator to treat all his chil-
dren alike and that the court erred in refusal to admit and 
consider such proferred evidence. 
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POINT TWO 
THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE WILL IS ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES THEREIN. 
Where ambiguities exist in a will and are incapable of 
being resolved by its provisions, the law is clear that resort 
may be had to extrinsic evidence to aid the court in ascer-
taining the real intention of the testator as evidenced by 
the language he used. 
The above general rule in this connection is stated and 
discussed by the following authorities: 
69 C. J. Section1173, p. 135: " ... generally speaking, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible, when necessary, both 
to place the court in a knowledge of the condition and 
circumstances surrounding the testator when he exe-
cuted his will, and to resolve uncertainties or ambigui-
ties in the will as to the testator's intentions; ... " 
Ibid, Section 1178, pp. 144-146: "While extrinsic evi-
. dence is not admissible to remove a doubt or ambiguity 
which may fairly be resolved by a resort to the context 
of the instrument, yet where the language of a will is 
doubtful or ambiguous, parol or extrinsic evidence may 
be admitted for the purpose of assisting the court in 
ascertaining its meaning; or as the rule is frequently 
stated, when it is necessary, in order to enable the court 
to ascertain the intention of the testator, parol evidence 
may be admitted for the purpose of showing and ex-
plaining a latent ambiguity arising as to the identity 
of the beneficiary or subject matter of the will." 
4 Page on Wills (Lifetime Edition) Section 1617, pp. 
626-7: "The meaning and application of the terms of 
the will cannot be understood until the property and 
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beneficiaries have been identified, which can be done 
only by extrinsic evidence; and, in many instances, un-
til the court understands testator's situation with ref-
erence to his property, the natural objects of his boun-
ty, and his contemplated beneficiaries. Evidence of 
this sort explains the meaning of the will; and, not in-
frequently, this meaning is varied to the extent that 
the will evidently means something different, when read 
in the light of admissible extrinsic evidence, from the 
meaning which it appeared to have without such evi-
dence. It is said that such evidence is received, not to 
defeat, but to aid in determining the testator's intent 
when that intent is uncertain from a reading of the 
will itself, and to explain or resolve doubts, not to cre-
ate them." 
Ibid, Section 1618, pp. 628-30: "The question of the 
admissibility of parol e·vidence, therefore, is generally 
raised where the will, either upon its face, or by reason 
of imperfect description of the subject-matter of the 
gift or the object of the testator's bounty, is ambigu-
ous or uncertain. It is ofted stated, as a general prin-
ciple, that evidence of extrinsic circumstances is admis-
sible to aid in interpretating a will which is ambiguous." 
"While in some cases considerable stress is put on 
the fact that evidence is admissible because of the am-
biguity of the will, this is because it is only in such 
cases that extrinsic evidence needs to be considered in 
construing the will; and in any case, whether the will 
appears ambiguous or not, the court is entitled to hear 
such extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstan-
ces as will put it in the place of testator." 
The foregoing doctrine is recognized in the State of 
Utah by the case of In re Pickard's Estate (1912) 42 Utah 
105, 129 P. 353. In that case the testatrix bequeathed her 
property to a trustee, first to provide for a living income to 
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her husband, and secondly to be equally divided between her 
two children, " ... except so far as sums have been or 
shall be set off against the interests which either would be 
entitled to under the provisions of this will, respectively, in 
case such sums had remained a part of the assets of the 
estate; the shares of my said daughter and son to be deter-
mined as of the date of my decease." Her daughter (execu-
trix) petitioned for final distribution alleging that before 
the will was made the testatrix advanced to her son the sum 
of $2,750 upon the understanding that such sum was paid 
out of her estate as an advancement, which should be taken 
into consideration in the distribution of the estate property. 
This the son denied, and the trial court refused to consider 
extrinsic evidence of this fact and held that the two children 
of testatrix share equally in her estate. On appeal the Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court and held that the evi-
dence pertaining to advancements made by testatrix in her 
lifetime should have been admitted, since the third clause 
of the will intended some sort of set-off against the interests 
the brother and sister would be entitled to under the will. 
In this connection this court had the following to say: (pp. 
110-11 Utah Report) 
"We therefore look to the will to see what she did 
in such particular. The respondent asserts that by the 
will the two contestants were given equal proportions 
without qualification of any kind in and to the residue 
of such property. The appellant asserts the contrary. 
We think, on the face of the will, the contention of the 
respondent cannot prevail, for it is clear that the tes-
tatrix, by the language used by her, 'except so far as 
sums have been or shall be set off against the interests 
which either would be entitled to under the provisions of 
this will', etc., intended some sort of set off against the 
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respective interests of such legatees. If it be assumed 
that by such language she meant and intended the sum 
or sums of money paid by her to one and not to the 
other, or the excess that the one had received over the 
other, then was parol evidence admissible to show the 
amount or amounts thereof. If on the other hand it be 
assumed that such language is ambiguous and the in-
tention of the testatrix in such particular uncertain 
when tJhe whole of the will is looked to, then, again, was 
parol evidence of pertinent facts and circumstances ad-
missible to aid the ,court in ascertaining and determining 
the real or actual intention of the testatrix as evidenced 
by the language so used by her. And it would seem that 
on the latter, and not the former, theory was such parol 
evidence admissible." 
In the instant case, as indicated above under Point One, 
the language of tQe will has created ambiguities more ex-
tensive than did the provision in the Pickard will. If it was 
error to exclude proferred clarifying extrinsi,c evidence in 
that case, a fortiori, it was error for the trial court to do 
so in the instant ,case. How can effect be given to testator's 
declared intention to treat all his childen alike until the pro-
ferred extrinsic evidence has been received and considered 
on the matter of his conflicting statements as to advance-
ments responsible for the ambiguities which must be re-
solved? 
As pointed out by Professor Page ( 4 Page on Wills, 
Lifetime Edition, Section 1623) a great many courts in this 
connection only allow extrinsic evidence if the ambiguity 
is latent, as distinguished from i1s being patent. Appellants 
submit that their proferred extrinsic evidence was admis-
sible to sustain the allegations of their petition even under 
this distinction rule. Even though the Utah Supreme Court 
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has made no such distinction in cases of this character we 
call attention to Professor Page's criticism of it which fol-
lows: 
Ibid., pp. 654: "Accordingly, while admitting that 
many excellent authorities have discussed the law of 
extrinsic evidence in construction upon the basis of the 
distinction between patent and latent ambiguities, it 
undoubtedly would be a step in advance in the develop-
ment of our law to discard the distinction entirely. No 
distinction or classification, whether old or new, which 
cuts across the actual distinctions which courts are 
forced to make in order to do justice between litigants, 
should be either accepted or retained. That the dis-
tinction is not founded upon sound principle can be seen 
from the fact that even the courts which have most 
frequently invoked it, regularly proceed, in deciding 
cases, so to explain the distinction between the patent 
and latent ambiguities as to eliminate it practically from 
the discussion, and instead use the distinction between 
evidence of testator's intention direct and evidence of 
the surrounding facts and circumstances as the funda-
mental distinction to be observed." 
The case of Payne vs. Todd et al, 43 P2d 1004 {1935), 
illustrates the modern trend of judicial thought conce:niing 
the problem before this Court. In that case the testator 
declared in paragraph 4 of his will that he forgave a debt 
owed him by his son, Stanley T. Payne, in the sum of ap-
proximately $3,000.00 plus accrued interest at the date of 
testator's death and fw·ther provided as follows: 
" ... it being my purpose to have the said debt 
cancelled, if it still exists at the time of my death, and 
this cancellation is made as a part of the share of my 
estate which might otherwise be ,bequeathed to him, 
and my said son will understand this arrangement." 
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In the seventh paragraph of the will the testator left 
the residue of his property in equal shares to his five chil-
dren. The executor claimed that Stanley was not entitled 
to share under the residuary clause and had only the right 
to receive the documents evidencing the indebtedness. Stan-
ley denied the executor's claim and offered extrinsic evi-
dence of advancements made by testator to his children dlll'-
ing his lifetime, and the relationships and circumstances ex-
isting at the time they were made, in order to clear up the 
ambiguities created by the language of the will. The trial 
court refused to hear the evidence on the ground that the 
will was clear and w1ambiguous. On appeal the Supreme 
Court of Arizona held that the trial court erred in refusing 
to hear the evidence proferred because the will was am-
biguous and required extrinsic evidence to put the court in 
the position of the testator at the time the will was made 
so that a proper construction of it could be made. 
The following excerpts from that case are particularly 
germane to the question before this court: 
"The difficulty is with clause four. By its terms 
he specifically forgave to the appellant herein a debt 
which originally amounted to $3,000.00. He evidently 
contemplated that his son would make payments upon 
the debt, but that it might not be fully paid before his 
death. If clause four had stopped at the phrase 'if it 
still exists at the time of my death,' there can be no 
doubt that a forgiveness of the debt, in addition to par-
ticipation in the residuary bequest, was intended by the 
testator. The difficulty arises over the construction 
of the remaining portion of the clause, which says that 
the cancellation is a part of appellant's share of tes-
tator's estate 'which might otherwise be bequeathed to 
him.' It is the contention of the executor that these 
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last words are equivalent to 'which has been bequeathed 
to him in clause seven of the will.' It is the position of 
appellant that its meaning is 'which would have been, 
but because of this clause has not been, bequeathed by 
this will.' We are of the opinion that a plausible ar-
gument can be made, and indeed has been made in the 
briefs of the respective parties, in favor of each con-
struction suggested. Such being the case we must hold 
that clause four is ambiguous in its meaning when ta-
ken in connection ·with all the remainder of the will. 
"The question then is, is this ambiguity of such a 
nature that parol evidence is admitted, not to vary or 
contradict the terms of the will, but to explain the 
meaning of the testator when he used the words which 
he did? A good deal of the time is devoted in the briefs 
to a discussion of the difference between a patent and 
a latent ambiguity and the rules applying thereto. The 
older decisions tend to hold that it is only latent am-
biguities which may be explained by parol evidence. 
The more modern cases seem to take the view that any 
ambiguity which may be cleared up by a showing of 
the circumstances surrounding the testator at the tim~ 
he made his will is susceptible of explanation by parol 
evidence." 
After discussing two prior decisions the court concludes: 
"We think, following the rules laid down in these 
two cases, that parol evidence is admissible for the pur-
pose of explaining either a patent or latent ambiguity 
in the will, but that it can only go to the extent of show-
ing the circumstances surrounding the testator at the 
time he made the will, such as previous advancements 
to his children, his desire in regard to an equalization 
of bequests, the character and value of the property 
disposed of by the will, and similar matters.'' 
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Upon the record before this Court, and based upon the 
foregoing appliooble law, the conclusion is clear that the 
trial court erred in refusing to admit the proferred evidence, 
and in dismissing the petition of George Baum and Oliver 
Batun. 
CONCLUSION 
vVe conclude that paragraphs II, III, IV and V of tes-
tator's wlll, when read in reference to paragraph XI there-
of, create serious ambiguities as to what the testator inten-
ded for his two sons, George Baum and Oliver Baum; also 
as to what he intended with respect to all advancements 
he made to any or all of his children; and that it would be 
impossible to give effect to testator's declared intention to 
treat all of his children alike without resorting to extrinsic 
evidence to explain these advancement provisions of his will. 
Appellants contend that reading the will in the light 
of the facts alleged in their petition warrants the conclu-
sion that it was the intention of testator to treat all of his 
children alike in the disposition of his property at his death. 
To achieve this result the testator naturally referred in his 
will to his two sons (appellants) with whom he had had the 
most to do in connection with his property in his lifetime. 
Since he no doubt realized that his dealings with them had 
been complicated and had been long since terminated, it is 
apparent that he did not remember the full significance of 
what had transpired between them. He undoubtedly felt 
that in fairness to the rest of his children those transactions 
should be considered at the time his estate was settled, so 
that any property of his that appellants had received with-
out paying any consideration for, in return should be 
charged against their share of his estate. Also in fairness 
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to appellants he made provision that if testator either had 
not given them their share in advancements, or had "other-
wise declared in writing" concerning advancements, then ap-
pellants would be treated "alike" and share equally with the 
other children. He also realized that he had had other tran-
sactions with other children and therefore intended that 
they be considered at the time the estate was to be distribu-
ted. Since the testator wanted to treat the children "alike" 
his reference, without identification, to advanceme~ts made, 
clearly shows that what he intended to be accomplished was 
that when the estate was settled all advancements which he 
had made in his lifetime to any or either of his six children 
should be off -set against the respective one-sixth interest 
of each child. 
It is submitted that if the foregoing construction is not 
adopted the children of testator will not have been accorded . 
like treatment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BALLIF & BALLIF 
George S. Ballif 
George E. Ballif 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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